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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MARSHALL
PHILLIP NEVILSON
Petitioner,
v.
No. 09-0654
MARSHOOGLE INC.,
a Marshall Corporation,
Respondent.
I. INTRODUCTION
Petitioner, Phillip Nevilson, appeals to the Marshall Supreme Court
from a decision affirming the granting of summary judgment in favor of
Respondent, Marshoogle, Inc., on his claims of intrusion upon seclusion,
publication of private facts, and tortious interference with business expectancy claims.
The issues in this case concern whether an individual can state a
claim for invasion of privacy against an Internet search engine provider
where liability is based on taking a photograph of an individual in his
home and the publication of such photograph on a website. The final issue concerns whether the act of publication of the photograph in question
constituted a tortious interference with a business expectancy.
A. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Phillip Nevilson’s five count complaint, filed in August 2008, in the
District Court of Marshall, alleged defamation, appropriation of name
and likeness, intrusion upon seclusion, publicity given to private life, and
tortious interference with a business expectancy. Marshoogle moved to
dismiss all counts for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted, pursuant to Marshall R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The circuit court
granted Marshoogle’s motion as to the defamation and appropriation of
name and likeness counts but denied it as to the three remaining counts.
Following discovery, Marshoogle moved for summary judgment on
the three remaining counts. The circuit court granted the motion on all
three counts.
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Nevilson appealed to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals for the
State of Marshall, and sought review of the trial court’s entry of summary judgment. The Fourth Circuit Court affirmed the circuit court’s
findings in their entirety.
Nevilson petitioned for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of the
State of Marshall, which granted leave to appeal.
B. BACKGROUND INFORMATION
The parties stipulate that the court of appeals decision shall serve as
the record on appeal. The court of appeals decision sets forth the following facts:
Marshoogle, Inc. is a corporation based and operating in the State of
Marshall. Marshoogle runs a website that provides free Internet search
services to users including citizens of Marshall. The Marshoogle search
function includes stock quotes, sports scores, translations, calculations,
maps, definitions, and a wide variety of other information. Marshoogle
generates most of its revenue from advertisement sales and other mediarelated services. Throughout the years, Marshoogle has expanded and
launched several new features, the most successful of which are an email feature; Marshoogle News including a highly popular “SportsBlog”
that includes end-user generated content, as well as posts from Marshoogle News’ own staff reporters known as “News Beagles;” and
“MarshMaps” a service that provides online mapping and driving directions. In June 2007, Marshoogle launched yet another new feature for its
highly successful mapping and driving directions, the Marshoogle Avenue Perspective (“M.A.P”). Through M.A.P., users can type an address
on the “MarshMaps” website and view a map of the location. When users
click on the M.A.P. link, they can obtain a 360 degree panoramic view of
the entire area surrounding the address.
Marshoogle obtains the images that form the panoramic views
through the use of M.A.P. mobiles, which are cars with cameras attached
on top of adjustable five-foot poles, similar to the one illustrated in Appendix I. There are nine cameras attached to each pole to capture the
360 degree views. Marshoogle employees drive the M.A.P. mobiles down
streets in Marshall, and each camera automatically takes digital pictures as the M.A.P. mobile moves along. Once the M.A.P. mobile has
completed a route, the individual images are run through a computer
program that connects all of the separate images together to create one
continuous amalgamated image. Then, the amalgamated image is incorporated into Marshoogle’s M.A.P. feature and available on Marshoogle’s
website. When a user views these combined images through M.A.P., it
appears as though the user is driving down the street. Using a keyboard
or mouse, the user may adjust the horizontal and vertical viewing direc-
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tion to see the entire area. M.A.P. users can also zoom in on each photograph to obtain a close-up view of a building, object, or person captured
by Marshoogle’s cameras. When it was first launched, M.A.P. covered
only central streets in Marshall City, but now it provides 360 degree imagery of most streets in the State of Marshall.
The images available on M.A.P. often show cars, people, and anything else present when the M.A.P. mobiles captured the images. The
creation of the panoramic amalgamated images is an entirely automated
process. When the M.A.P. feature was first launched, neither the original images, nor the combined panoramic images were in any way edited
or altered before being made available to M.A.P. users. However, after
receiving complaints about Marshoogle’s M.A.P. mobiles taking pictures
of houses, businesses, and individuals, Marshoogle decided to modify its
practice by introducing blurring technology. This technology automatically blurs the faces of the individuals and car license plates appearing in
any of the digital images, prior to these pictures being incorporated into
the M.A.P. feature. At the same time, Marshoogle introduced an online
process for users to request that a particular photograph be removed
from M.A.P. As stated in a press release issued by Marshoogle in January 2008:
Marshoogle is committed to ensuring the satisfaction of our users.
Therefore, we have implemented blurring technology and operational
controls including image removal. By completing our online image removal form, users can have photographs of themselves or their property
completely removed from M.A.P., even when the images have already
been blurred.

No legal action against Marshoogle and M.A.P. was taken prior to
this present action. Prior disputes have been settled privately, generally
by the removal the image or images in question.
Marshoogle promoted this feature by claiming that its use would
benefit tourism, help people in their search for property to rent or buy,
and assist users in finding local businesses or meeting points. Marshoogle advertised M.A.P. using such slogans as “Take a virtual tour of
your future neighborhood” and “Tour the city as if you were on top of a
tourist bus.” As the M.A.P. feature gained popularity in Marshall, users
increasingly began to conduct M.A.P. searchers for publicly known addresses of celebrities’ homes and addresses of popular celebrity “hot
spots” to obtain images of celebrity houses or images of their favorite
celebrities captured at the searched location by the M.A.P. mobiles.
Phillip Nevilson is a young athlete who excelled in the sport of diving and is widely viewed as a success story for underprivileged youth.
Nevilson grew up in Lower Marshall Township, a low income, blue collar
neighborhood, known for its juvenile criminal activity (mostly drug related). Nevilson was discovered in 1998, at the age of thirteen by Coach
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Timothy Knight (“Coach Tim”), the director of the prestigious Marshall
Athletic Club (“MAC”). MAC is a private athletic club in Upper Marshall
Township, renowned for producing some of the most talented swimmers
and divers in the state, thanks to MAC’s world-class coaching staff.
Coach Tim was so impressed by Nevilson’s natural talent that he offered
to foster Nevilson and personally train him at the MAC for free.
Nevilson excelled under the direction of Coach Tim. He went on to
win first or second place in all the athletic competitions in which he participated, culminating in his winning three gold medals in the 2007 Junior World Diving Championships. After this event, Nevilson spent most
of his time training and preparing for the Olympic Trials, to be held in
Marshall City in July 2008. These trials would determine who would be
members of the 2010 Olympic Diving Team. In order to become a member of the Olympic Team, Nevilson needed to place in the top two for
each of the events in which he wished to compete. Based on his athletic
talent, his performance in the 2007 Junior World Championships and his
growing reputation, Nevilson was heralded as the “next big diving star”
and a top contender in the 2010 Olympics. Mainstream media and sports
news outlets, including “SportsBlog,” Marshoogle’s popular athletic
newsletter and blog, predicted that he would trounce the competition at
the trials and be the first to qualify for the 2010 U.S. Olympic Diving
Team.
News media coverage of Nevilson’s journey to success reflected a
general feeling among the people of Marshall that Nevilson represented
the true potential of Marshall’s youth. Overcoming the obstacles of poverty and taking a different path in life than most children raised in
Lower Marshall Township, Nevilson had become widely regarded as a
role model, especially to many young people who faced similar
challenges.
In January 2008, Nevilson was featured in several promotional publications of Marshall City Against Drugs (“MCAD”) campaign with the
logo “Do sports not drugs.” However, not everyone in Marshall agreed
with Nevilson’s status as role model. When MCAD announced it had retained Nevilson as a spokesman, Marshoogle’s SportsBlog expressed
skepticism, stating that although Nevilson was undeniably a very talented athlete, his role model status was exaggerated.
Statements like these had no effect on Nevilson’s popularity. As
Nevilson’s popularity grew, so did the endorsement offers. He managed
to earn significant income by accepting several endorsement offers from
local corporations and businesses, such as the SwimShop, a leading Marshall sports equipment and sportswear retailer. Nevilson appeared on
several TV commercials as a result of the endorsements. If he qualified
for the 2010 U.S. Olympic Diving Team – as was anticipated by the
mainstream media and sport blogs – he was expected to receive a three
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million dollar (US) endorsement contract to represent Sunshine AthleticWear, a nationwide sportswear corporation. Sunshine AthleticWear is
the most coveted sports endorsement contract in the sports community.
In fact, the details of Nevilson’s deal with Sunshine AthleticWear had
been leaked to the media sometime in early March 2008. On March 25,
2008, after several weeks of speculation in the press, Athena Buck, Sunshine AthleticWear’s president, made a public statement admitting that
her company had negotiated a three million dollar endorsement deal
with Nevilson that was contingent upon his becoming a member of the
U.S. Olympic Diving Team. She stated that Sunshine AthleticWear was
“behind Nevilson 100 percent and wished him well at the Olympic Trials.” Buck’s statement was picked up by the national media as well as
news outlets throughout the State of Marshall. In addition, several
other major corporations informally expressed interest in having Nevilson serve as spokesman for their products.
With his newfound affluence, in October 2007 Nevilson moved from
Lower Marshall Township to a two-story house located on the border of
Emerald Pools, a community where many of Marshall City’s rich and
famous reside. Emerald Pools has become a popular tourist attraction
because of its famous residents and several companies operate doubledecker celebrity bus tours of the area. Even though he resided in an area
inundated by tourists and celebrities, Nevilson kept a low profile. He
rarely socialized or went out in public, choosing instead to focus on his
training. Nevilson protected his house by surrounding it on all sides by a
six-foot wooden fence. Signs signaling “Private Property” and “No Trespass” were posted on the fence.
On the evening of April 15, 2008, Nevilson was on the second floor of
his home. He was relaxing on his recliner by the window and watching a
televised basketball game while sipping some wine and enjoying some
fine tobacco. As was his usual ritual, Nevilson enjoyed his tobacco out of
his Moroccan hookah, a Middle-Eastern water pipe that can also be used
for recreational marijuana use. At the same time Nevilson was enjoying
his wine and hookah, a M.A.P. mobile was driving down the streets of
the Emerald Pools community photographing images for M.A.P. As the
vehicle drove by Nevilson’s corner estate it snapped several photographs
of the properties on his street, including photographs of Nevilson’s residence, and by happenstance, Nevilson sitting in his living room and inhaling from the hookah. The image of Nevilson by his window was small
as it was taken from the street some distance away.
Not long after the images of Nevilson were taken by the M.A.P. mobile, these images, along with other images that made up the panoramic
amalgamated image of Nevilson’s street, were uploaded to M.A.P. by
Marshoogle. The images uploaded on the website did not include a blurring of Nevilson’s face.
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Although it is unclear how many users accessed the M.A.P. image of
Nevilson, on April 21, 2008, the following entry appeared on SportsBlog:
If you want to see what Marshall’s own ‘three million dollar man’ does
in his spare time, go on M.A.P.

The SportsBlog statement was followed by a link to the M.A.P. image of Nevilson on Marshoogle. After this posting, there was a huge increase in traffic to the M.A.P. feature and “Sports Blog.” Nevilson
became aware of the hookah smoking images on M.A.P. and on April 30,
2008, contacted Marshoogle requesting the immediate removal of the
images. Marshoogle acknowledged his request and the images in question were removed by May 7, 2008.
There is no evidence in the record as to how many individuals
viewed the photographs of Nevilson on M.A.P. other than the reporter
who posted the link on SportsBlog.
The parties do not dispute that Nevilson became the subject of widespread negative media attention beginning in late April 2008, and that
the photographs taken by the M.A.P. mobiles and incorporated into Marshoogle’s M.A.P. feature were the primary reason for this attention. As a
result, rumors about Nevilson’s alleged drug use spread quickly throughout the sports and entertainment communities. Several tabloids and
other news outlets published “digitally enhanced” versions of the infamous images with stories related to Nevilson’s alleged drug use. For example, the Marshall Star published the photograph of Nevilson inhaling
from the hookah captioned “Nevilson Has Reached New Highs.” In addition, the popular Marshall newspaper, the Marshall Tribune, featured
the infamous photograph with the caption “Shame on You Nevilson!” on
its first page.
Fans and citizens alike expressed their disappointment, and in some
cases anger, towards what they claimed was a betrayal of trust by their
athletic idol and role model. The Marshall Diving Association initiated a
formal investigation into Nevilson’s alleged drug use, which could result
in his disqualification for the 2010 Olympic Trials. MCAD removed all
references of Nevilson from its anti-drug campaign. During this time, numerous paparazzi kept vigil outside Nevilson’s home and followed him
every time he ventured out of his house.
Nevilson reacted by issuing several press releases and proactively
contacting the media. Nevilson made numerous appearances on local
television and radio news, sports and talk shows and was given significant “air time” to explain his perhaps unwise, but completely legal use of
tobacco. Nevertheless, Nevilson’s prospective endorsement deals quickly
evaporated. MCAD refused to resume working with Nevilson on its campaign. In private correspondence with the companies involved, Nevilson
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was invariably informed that the sponsors did not believe it was in the
companies’ best interests to have him represent them.
In July 2008, the Olympic Trials were held in Marshall City. Nevilson’s performance was well below average and he finished in third place
missing his chance to participate in the 2010 Olympics as a member of
the U.S. Olympic Diving Team. Because he was unable to secure a position on the team, Nevilson’s deal with Sunshine AthleticWear did not go
forward. In press releases following the completion of the Olympic Trials, Nevilson attributed his bad performance to the intense media coverage surrounding his alleged drug use and his efforts to clear his name.
In August 2008, Nevilson commenced this litigation against Marshoogle, Inc.
II. ISSUES PRESENTED
There are three issues raised on appeal before the Supreme Court of
Marshall:
(1) Whether the
Nevilson’s claim
(2) Whether the
Nevilson’s claim
(3) Whether the
Nevilson’s claim

circuit court erred in granting summary judgment on
of intrusion upon seclusion;
circuit court erred in granting summary judgment on
of publicity given to private life; and
circuit court erred in granting summary judgment on
of tortious interference with business expectancy.

III. ANALYSIS OF ISSUES
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment allows a court to dispose of part or all of a case
prior to trial. In the State of Marshall, summary judgment is governed
by Rule 56 of the Marshall Rules of Civil Procedure. Under this rule,
summary judgment is proper only if there are no genuine issues of material facts, then the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law.1 The court considers the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, and affidavits in assessing whether summary
judgment is proper.2 A genuine issue of material fact exists only if “a
fair-minded jury could return a verdict for the [non-moving party] on the
evidence presented.”3
An appellate court reviews a grant of summary judgment de novo,
applying the same standard as the trial court.4 The reviewing court determines whether a genuine issue of material fact exists by viewing the
1. Marshall R. Civ. P. 56(c) (R. at 1). Rule 56(c) is similar or identical to the corresponding provision of the federal rules, Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
2. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
3. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986).
4. Delta Sav. Bank v. United States, 265 F.3d 1017, 1021 (9th Cir. 2001).
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evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and drawing all reasonable and justifiable inferences in favor of that party.5 The
moving party has the burden of identifying the material facts that are
without genuine dispute and support the entry of summary judgment in
favor of the moving party.6 To survive the motion, the non-moving party
must identify which material facts raise genuine issues of dispute.7 Because the entry of summary judgment “is a drastic means of disposing of
litigation,”8 it should be granted only when the moving party’s right to
relief is “clear and free from doubt.”9 However, the mere fact that there
exists “some alleged factual dispute between the parties”10 or “some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts”11 is insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment.
B. INTRUSION UPON SECLUSION
i.

General

The common law tort of invasion of privacy, as developed by the
courts, comprises four distinct wrongs, each of which represents an interference with the individual’s right to lead a private life, free from the
prying eyes, ears, and publications of others.12 Thus, four forms of invasion of the right of privacy have become crystallized and held to be actionable:13 (a) unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another;
(b) appropriation of the other’s name or likeness; (c) unreasonable publicity given to the other’s private life; (d) publicity that unreasonably
places the other in a false light before the public.14
The form of invasion of privacy by an unreasonable and offensive
intrusion upon an individual’s seclusion consists solely of an intentional
interference with this individual’s interest in solitude or seclusion, either
as to his person or as to his private affairs or concerns. This intrusion
may be into plaintiff’s physical solitude or seclusion, such by invading
his home, or through other means by the use of the defendant’s senses,
with or without mechanical aids, to oversee or overhear the plaintiff’s
private affairs, such as wiretapping. Unique to this form of invasion of
privacy is that that liability does not depend on the publication of the
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
Id. at 324.
Purtill v. Hess, 489 N.E.2d 867, 871 (Ill. 1986).
Id.
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247 (emphasis omitted).
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652A cmt. b (1977).
Id. at cmt. c.
Id.
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private information; it is the act of intrusion itself that renders the defendant to liability.
ii. Elements
Nevilson’s first claim alleges that Marshoogle committed an invasion of privacy in the form of intrusion upon seclusion. Marshall courts
have consistently applied § 652B of the Restatement (Second) of Torts
(1977), which recognizes that an action lies for intrusion upon seclusion
if the plaintiff can show these elements: (1) there was an unauthorized
intrusion into another’s seclusion; (2) the intrusion was intentional (3)
the intrusion was offensive or objectionable to a reasonable person; (4)
the matter intruded upon was private.
Some states also include an additional element, that the intrusion
causes anguish and suffering.15 This element may be discussed, but is
not necessary for establishing liability under the Restatement.
1. Unauthorized Intrusion into Nevilson’s Seclusion
The first element of the intrusion upon seclusion tort is an unauthorized intrusion upon another’s seclusion. The Restatement clarifies that
the intrusion need not be of the physical variety; it can also be through
use of a camera.16 Courts following the Restatement have held that “a
defendant is subject to liability ‘only when he has intruded into a private
place, or has otherwise invaded a private seclusion that the plaintiff has
thrown about his person or affairs.”17
Marshoogle will likely argue that the photograph taken by the
M.A.P. mobile did not intrude on Nevilson’s seclusion. Marshoogle will
likely cite Schiller v. Mitchell, where the court held that the plaintiffs
failed to establish the intrusion and private matter elements in their
15. Burns v. Masterbrand Cabinets, Inc., 874 N.E.2d 72, 77 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007); Melvin
v. Burling, 49 N.E.2d 1011, 1012 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986).
16. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B. Comment b. to § 652B of the Restatement
reads:
[T]he invasion may be by physical intrusion into a place in which the plaintiff has
secluded himself, as when the defendant forces his way into the plaintiff’s room in
a hotel or insists over the plaintiff’s objection in entering his home. It may also be
by the use of the defendant’s senses, with or without mechanical aids, to oversee or
overhear the plaintiff’s private affairs, as by looking into his upstairs windows
with binoculars or tapping his telephone wires. It may be by some other form of
investigation or examination into his private concerns, as by opening his private
and personal mail, searching his safe or his wallet, examining his private bank
account, or compelling him by a forged court order to permit an inspection of his
personal documents. The intrusion itself makes the defendant subject to liability,
even though there is no publication or other use of any kind of the photograph or
information outlined. Id.
17. In re Marriage of Tigges, 758 N.W.2d 824, 829 n. 3 (Iowa 2008) quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts §652B.
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cause of action for intrusion upon seclusion against the defendants, their
neighbors, who videotaped the plaintiffs’ property.18 In so holding, the
court noted that the plaintiffs failed to “explain why a passerby on the
street or a roofer or a tree trimmer could not see what the camera saw.”19
Similarly, in McLain v. Boise, the court held that the plaintiff did not
state an invasion of privacy claim where the defendant photographed the
plaintiff on his property, even though the defendant trespassed.20 The
court reasoned that the plaintiff was not even aware that he was being
under surveillance, and a neighbor or passerby could have seen the
plaintiff on his property in the daylight.21 A similar result occurred in
Wehling v. Columbia Broad. Sys., the court held that when a video camera filmed the plaintiff’s home and nothing more than what was viewable
from the public street was shown, the matter filmed was not private.22
Additionally, in Swerdlick v. Koch, the court held that activities occurring in plain view of the public are not entitled to the protection of the
privacy torts “merely because they occur on private property in the vicinity of the [plaintiff]’s home.” 23
Based on the above, Marshoogle should point to the fact that Nevilson was sitting in front of his window and would have been clearly visible to any passerby on the street, at the same time the M.A.P. mobile
passed by. Indeed, the six-foot tall fence erected outside the home was
clearly not tall enough to block the view into the second-floor window
from the street, enabling any members of the public to see Nevilson
smoking the hookah through his second-story windows. Marshoogle will
argue that this is especially true in the present case because of the many
double-decker tour buses on which tourists could obtain the same, if not
better, view of Nevilson in his living room. Marshoogle will argue that it
did not trespass on Nevilson’s property to obtain the photograph in question, and Nevilson was not even the target of the photograph.24
Nevilson will likely argue that as the Restatement states, and courts
in several jurisdictions and have found, non-physical intrusions exist in
situations similar to his. An unauthorized “peering into the windows of a
private home” has been considered as a prime example of an intrusion
upon seclusion.25 Nevilson may cite Benitez v. KFC National Manage18. Schiller v. Mitchell, 828 N.E.2d 323, 329 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005).
19. Id.
20. McLain v. Boise Cascade Corp., 533 P.2d 343, 346 (Or. 1975).
21. Id.
22. Wheling v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 721 F.2d 506, 509 (5th Cir. 1983).
23. Swerdlick v. Koch, 721 A.2d 849, 857 (R.I. 1998). The court held that the activity
photographed by the defendants was “in full public view . . . albeit it happened in the
vicinity of the plaintiff’s residence.” Id.
24. (R. at 4).
25. Lovgren v. Citizens First Nat. Bank of Princeton, 534 N.E.2d 987 (Ill. 1989). “When
a picture is taken of a plaintiff while he is in the privacy of his home, . . . the taking of the
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ment Company, where the court noted that “examples of actionable intrusion upon seclusion would include . . . peering into the windows of a
private home,”26 as well as Summers v. Bailey, in which the court considered non-physical intrusion to be analogous to trespass into the plaintiff’s home, and extended the tort to include “prying and intrusions into
private concerns, such as eavesdropping by microphone and peering into
the windows of a home.”27 Similarly, in Louisiana, courts have found intrusion to occur when defendants “took pictures of [plaintiffs]” and
“watched [plaintiffs] in their home by peeking through their windows.” 28
A necessary component of this form of invasion of privacy consists of intrusion upon plaintiff’s solitude or seclusion.29 Nevilson will point out
that a person’s private home or property satisfies this requirement.30
Consequently, Nevilson will argue that Marshoogle’s M.A.P. mobile
photographing him, without his consent, while he was in the seclusion of
his private home, constitutes an invasion of his privacy.31 Nevilson surrounded his home on all sides by a six-foot wooden fence and posted “Private Property” and “No Trespass” signs.32 Nevilson will argue taking
such measure indicates that he considered his home to be a place of seclusion and privacy, and that this court should also view Nevilson’s home
as a protected area of solicitude.
Nevilson should distinguish Schiller and the other authority cited by
Marshoogle because these cases dealt mainly with the video surveillance
of the exterior of the plaintiffs’ home, rather than images of the interior.33 Nevilson will argue that interior portions of the home, such as his
second story living room, are much more secluded areas than a residence’s driveway or garage, and are considered private by the majority of
people. In Dietemann v. Time, Inc., the court found that “[p]laintiff’s den
picture may be considered an intrusion into the plaintiff’s privacy just as eavesdropping or
looking into his upstairs windows with binoculars are considered an invasion of his privacy.” Id.; see also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B cmt. b (1977).
26. Benitez v. KFC Nat. Mgmt. Co., 714 N.E.2d 1002, 1033 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999); Lovgren,
534 N.E.2d at 989.
27. Summers v. Bailey, 55 F.3d 1564, 1566 (11th Cir. 1995).
28. Souder v. Pendleton Detectives, 88 So.2d 716, 718 (La. Ct. App. 1956).
29. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B comment b.
30. Summers, 55 F.3d at 1567; Souder, 88 So.2d at 718; see also In re Marriage of
Tigges, 758 N.W.2d 824, 829 n. 3 (Iowa 2008); Taus v. Loftus, 151 P.3d 1185, 1212 (Cal.
2007) (stating that the claim of intrusion upon seclusion “is proven only if the plaintiff had
an objectively reasonable expectation of seclusion or solitude in the place”).
31. (R. at 6). See also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B comment b; see also Summers, 55 F.3d at 1567; Souder, 88 So.2d at 718; see also Tigges, 758 N.W.2d at 829 n. 3;
Taus, 151 P.3d at 1212 (stating that the claim of intrusion upon seclusion “is proven only if
the plaintiff had an objectively reasonable expectation of seclusion or solitude in the
place”).
32. (R. at 6).
33. Schiller, 828 N.E.2d at 329.
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was a sphere from which he could reasonably expect to exclude eavesdropping newsman.”34 Consequently, Nevilson may argue that although
taking pictures in public or of public things is lawful, Nevilson’s living
room is a sphere in which he could expect to be free from the eyes and
cameras of a third party such as Marshoogle. Pedestrians or tourists
may have been able to glance at a certain point in time into Nevilson’s
second floor room, but that “does not automatically mean that he . . . can
legally be forced to be subject to being seen by everyone.”35 Therefore,
Marshoogle’s M.A.P. mobile photograph was analogous to peering into
the window of his private home, and was an actionable intrusion upon
his seclusion.
2. Intentional Intrusion
The second element of the intrusion upon seclusion tort requires a
plaintiff to show that the defendant intended to intrude.36 Intent is generally shown if “the actor desires to cause the consequences of his act, or
he believes that the consequences are substantially certain to result from
it.”37
Marshoogle will likely argue that there is no evidence in the Record
that Marshoogle intentionally intruded upon Nevilson’s seclusion. Marshoogle could point to O’Donnell v. United States, where the court concluded that “[a] person commits an intentional intrusion only if he
believes, or is substantially certain, that he lacks the necessary legal or
personal permission to commit the intrusive act.”38 Marshoogle will also
argue that, under well-established case law, the tort of intrusion upon
seclusion must be, at a minimum, an intentional act of trickery or
through the use of sensory enhancements.39 For instance, in Webb v.
CBS, the Northern District of Illinois found that intrusion had taken
place and focused on the means employed by the CBS reporter and cameraman to look into the backyard of the plaintiff’s private home that was
surrounded by a seven-foot fence.40
34. Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245, 249 (9th Cir. 1971).
35. Sanders v. Am. Broad. Co., Inc., 978 P.2d 67, 72 (Cal. 1999).
36. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B (1977).
37. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 8A (1965).
38. O’Donnell v. United States, 891 F.2d 1079, 1083 (3d Cir. 1989); see also Borse v.
Piece Goods Shop, Inc., 963 F.2d 611, 621 (3d Cir. 1992).
39. See e.g., Beckstrom v. Direct Merch.’s Credit Card Bank, No. Civ-04-1351, 2005 WL
1869107, at *4 (D. Minn. Aug. 5, 2005) (stating “[i]ntrusion upon seclusion is an intentional
tort”); Stien v. Marriott Ownership Resorts, Inc., 944 P.2d 374, 378 (Utah Ct. App. 1997)
(explaining intrusion must be both intentional and substantial); Leang v. Jersey City Bd. of
Educ., 969 A.2d 1097, 1115 (N.J. 2009) (holding that a defendant is liable for intrusion
upon seclusion only when the intrusion is intentional).
40. Webb v. CBS, No. 08-C-6241, 2009 WL 1285836 (N.D. Ill. May 7, 2009).
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To distinguish the cases above, Marshoogle will argue it did not engage in intentional and deliberate actions to capture information that
would otherwise not be visible to the naked eye. Quite the contrary,
Marshoogle’s M.A.P. mobile was engaged in the lawful activity of
photographing and recording public streets, and took pictures of areas
and objects that any member of the public was free to observe.41 Capturing Nevilson smoking his hookah was merely the unintentional and incidental consequence of the lawful activity of recording public streets and
taking pictures to enhance the MarshMap feature. Photographing Nevilson was not within the scope of the M.A.P. mobile, nor could or should
Marshoogle have known that the M.A.P. mobile’s photographic lens
would capture Nevilson in an allegedly embarrassing position. Therefore, since Marshoogle did not possess the requisite intent, Nevilson’s
intrusion claim must fail.
Nevilson will likely counter-argue that intent does not require malice, but rather that the person act with willingness, and that “he believes
that the consequences are substantially certain to result from it.”42
Nevilson will also argue that use of cameras for allegedly innocent and
unrelated purposes have been found to constitute intentional intrusion
upon a person’s seclusion.43 In Acuff v. IBP, the defendant had installed
a camera on its premises in order to catch a thief, but the camera also
recorded private medical examinations and treatments.44 The court still
found that a jury could reasonably conclude that IBP had acted intentionally, partially because the company continued operating the camera
and recording private events even after learning that medical treatments were being performed in that location.45 Moreover, in Snakenberg
v. Hartford Casualty Ins. Co., Inc., a defendant’s action is deemed intentional “if it is done willingly” and “the actor knows or ought to know [the]
result will follow from his conduct, whatever his desire may be as to that
result.”46
Nevilson will argue that much like the defendants in Acuff and
Snakenberg, Marshoogle willingly employed the M.A.P. mobiles and
their technologically advanced cameras to capture images of the entire
Marshall City. Furthermore, the record clearly indicates that Mar41. (R. at 7).
42. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 8A (1965).
43. Acuff v. IBP, Inc., 77 F. Supp. 2d 914 (C.D. Ill. 1999).
44. Id. at 918-22.
45. Id. at 923.
46. Snakenberg v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 383 S.E.2d 2, 5 (S.C. App. 1989). In
Snakenberg the defendant intentionally videotaped a space where females were changing
and captured images of them. Id. at 4. The court stated that “if the videotaping was an act
of volition and the resulting exposure of the girls was the expected or natural consequence
of that act, intent has been proved.” Id. at 8.
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shoogle knew that the photographs taken by the M.A.P. mobiles did capture private instances, as proved by the receipt of numerous complaints.
This knowledge is further evidenced by Marshoogle’s use of a blurring
function in the M.A.P. feature to distort images of faces and license
plates, and the implementation of the online photo-removal procedure.47
These actions clearly demonstrate that Marshoogle was fully aware that
the “expected or natural consequence”48 of photographing the streets
was the capturing of private images, evidencing that Marshoogle acted
intentionally in capturing the images of Nevilson inside his home.
3. Offensive or Objectionable to a Reasonable Person
The third element of the tort requires the plaintiff to show the intrusion was offensive or objectionable to a reasonable person.49 The Restatement requires any intrusion to be highly offensive to the ordinary
reasonable person, as the result of conduct to which the reasonable person would strongly object.”50 Courts following the Restatement’s view
require “some type of highly offensive prying into the physical boundaries or affairs of another person.”51
Marshoogle will likely argue that several cases interpreting the Restatement’s definition of intrusion upon seclusion apply a balancing test
for determining whether an intrusion rises to the level of highly offensive. For instance in Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, the California Supreme Court adopted a factor-based standard for determining
the offensiveness of an invasion under §652B of the Restatement that
examines: (1) the degree of the intrusion; (2) the context, conduct, and
circumstances surrounding the intrusion; (3) the intruder’s motives and
objectives; (4) the setting into which the intruder invades; and (5) the
expectations of those whose privacy is invaded.52
Consequently, Marshoogle will argue that the intrusion, if any, was
47. (R. at 4-5).
48. Snakenberg, 383 S.E.2d at 86.
49. Melvin, 490 N.E.2d at 1012.
50. Schiller v. Mitchell, 828 N.E.2d 323, 328 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005); Schmidt v. Ameritech
Ill., 768 N.E.2d 303, 312 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2002); Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 652B, cmt. d (1977). “There is likewise no liability unless the interference with the plaintiff’s seclusion is a substantial one, of a kind that would be highly offensive to the ordinary
reasonable man, as the result of conduct to which the reasonable man would strongly object.” Id.
51. Lovgren, 534 N.E. 2d at 989.
52. Hill v. Nat. Collegiate Athletic Ass’n., 865 P.2d 633, 648 (Cal. 1994); see e.g. Borse v.
Piece Goods Shop, Inc., 963 F.2d 611, 625 (3d Cir. 1992) (stating “whether an alleged invasion of privacy is substantial and highly offensive to the reasonable person necessitates the
use of a balancing test.”); Wilcher v. City of Wilmington, 60 F. Supp. 2d 298, 303 (D. Del.
1999) (same); Med. Lab. Mgmt. Consultants v. Am. Broad. Co., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1182, 1189
(D. Ariz. 1998) (same); Wolfson v. Lewis, 924 F. Supp. 1413, 1421 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (same).
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minimal.53 Marshoogle should point to Boring v. Google, where the court
held in a factually similar case that no one “other than the most exquisitely sensitive -would suffer shame or humiliation” as a result of
Google’s street view car taking photos of the plaintiff’s residence.54 Marshoogle will compare this photo of Nevilson’s home to the photo in Boring, and argue that a reasonable person would not find it highly offensive
to be seen smoking tobacco and drinking a glass of wine. On the other
hand, the context, conduct, and circumstances of the alleged intrusion
were innocuous and legitimate.55 The Marshoogle M.A.P. mobile was on
the mission of cataloging the streets, an accepted and regular practice in
the State of Marshall, in order to enhance the M.A.P. feature, and had no
intention to disturb or harass Nevilson.56
More importantly, Marshoogle should argue that the activities
viewed through Nevilson’s window are the type ordinarily viewed by
neighbors, and tolerated as ordinary disclosures of everyday life that is
of casual interest to others in the community.57 Marshoogle will likely
reiterate its arguments under the “unauthorized intrusion” and “intentional intrusion” elements, and claim that Nevilson cannot establish that
a reasonable person would take offense at being photographed when
Nevilson places himself in plain view of the public.58 In support of its
argument, it could also cite to Mark v. King Broad. Co.,59 which held
that invasion of privacy torts do not apply to claims pertaining to events
readily viewable by the general public.60
Nevilson will likely reiterate his arguments under Restatements
B(i)(1)&(2) and argue that any reasonable person would find it highly
offensive for an Internet search engine, such as Marshoogle or any individual, to take a photo of that person on the second floor of their private
residence. Nevilson will likely cite Webb v. CBS Broadcasting Inc.,
where the court held that a cameraman using a telephoto lens to video53. Stien, 944 P.2d at 379. The appellate court found that the degree of intrusion was
minimal, thus failing to establish the tort of intrusion upon seclusion. Id.
54. Boring v. Google, Inc., 598 F. Supp. 2d 695, 700 (W.D. Pa. 2009).
55. Wilcher, 60 F. Supp. 2d at 304 (holding that the context, conduct, and circumstances surrounding a drug testing policy where firefighters were forced to provide urine
samples—in front of collection monitors—did not rise to the level of implicating the tort of
intrusion upon seclusion).
56. (R. at 4).
57. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D cmt. c.
58. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B cmt. c (1977). There is no liability for observing a plaintiff “or even taking his photograph while he is walking on the public highway. . . and his appearance is public and open to the public eye.” Id.
59. Mark v. King Broad. Co., 618 P.2d 512, 519 (Wash Ct. App. 1980).
60. Id. This case involved an action brought by a pharmacist against a television station after it broadcast footage taken of him inside his pharmacy from a camera located
outside the pharmacy as the plaintiff remained visible to the public through a glass window. Id. at 519.
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tape the plaintiffs and their children in their bathing suits in a private
backyard pool was found to be highly offensive to a reasonable person.61
Nevilson should analogize Webb on the facts, and point out that he was
not just within his private property, as the plaintiffs were in Webb, but
inside his home on the second floor. Nevilson arguably expected more
privacy inside his home.
Nevilson will likely also draw the court’s attention to the invasive
nature of the technologically advanced equipment with the capabilities
of zoom in and focus on the details of his home, distinguishing this technology from the haphazard gaze of the naked eye. Nevilson could cite
Kyllo v. United States, in which the United States Supreme Court stated
that “[t]he question we confront today is what limits there are upon this
power of technology to shrink the realm of guaranteed privacy . . . [and]
the rule we adopt must take account of more sophisticated systems that
are already in use or in development.”62 Much like the thermal imaging
in Kyllo, Nevilson will argue that the use of technologically advanced
equipment such as megapixel, multi-function cameras, to snap continuous photos, recording and later rendering available on the Internet, everything, including private moments, in their path, is highly intrusive
and offensive. Marshoogle’s digital 360 degree photographs and zoom
function have damaged Nevilson’s “anonymity, intrude[d] upon his most
intimate activities, and expose[d] his most personal characteristics to
[the] public gaze.”63 Thus, Nevilson will argue that a reasonable person
would certainly find the intrusion upon his activities inside his home to
be highly offensive, and be seriously aggrieved by it. 64 At a minimum,
Nevilson should argue that the level of offensiveness presents an issue of
material fact rendering summary judgment inappropriate.
4. Private Matter
The fourth requirement for intrusion upon seclusion requires that
the matter intruded upon must be private. The privacy of the matter is a
threshold issue, because without private facts, the other three elements
of the tort are irrelevant.65 The plaintiff must establish that he or she
“attempted to keep private facts private.”66 Further, it makes no difference “whether the observation of openly displayed facts is accomplished
61.
62.
search
Court.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Webb, 2009 WL 1285836, at *3.
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34-36 (2001). Although this case involved a
and seizure claim it could be possible to analogize on the reasoning used by the
Briscoe v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, 483 P.2d 34, 37 (1971).
See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B cmt. b (1977).
Busse v. Motorola, Inc., 813 N.E. 2d 1013, 1017 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004).
Acosta v. Scott Labor LLC, 377 F. Supp. 2d 647, 650 (N.D. Ill. 2005).
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by video camera or the naked eye.”67
Marshoogle would argue that these were not private facts, and
Nevilson made no attempt to conceal them. Reiterating its arguments
above, it will likely point to Schiller, where the court denied the claim
that defendants intruded upon a private matter by videotaping the
plaintiffs’ property, noting that the plaintiffs failed to “explain why a
passerby on the street or a roofer or a tree trimmer could not see what
the camera saw.”68 It will also cite again to Mark v. King Broad. Co.69
and Swerdlick v. Koch, where the court held that filming the plaintiff’s
home business did not constitute an invasion of his physical solitude or
seclusion.70 In Swerdlick, the court stated that the activity photographed including trucks entering and leaving plaintiff’s driveway and
activity around his residence, was “in full public view, albeit it happened
in the vicinity of the residence” 71 and held that activities occurring in
plain view of the public are not entitled to the protection of the privacy
torts “merely because they occur on private property in the vicinity of the
actor’s home.”72
Consequently, Marshoogle will point out that Nevilson was sitting in
an area where there was an unobstructed view from the street. Marshoogle’s cameras captured his image from a lawful vantage point on a
public street, by cameras mounted on the M.A.P. mobile car no taller
than the buses that carry tourists past Nevilson’s home every day.73 It
could also argue that Nevilson failed to take any steps to ensure his privacy, such as closing blinds or curtains, thereby allowing anyone, either
at street level or on a bus, to observe his activities through the window.
Thus, Nevilson’s activities were open to the public eye, and are not private facts.74
Nevilson should counter this argument by distinguishing the above
cited cases on the facts. As stated above, in these cases, the defendants’
recording equipment only captured images of the external area of the
plaintiffs’ home.75 Here, Marshoogle’s M.A.P. mobile cameras not only
captured the exterior of his home, but also Nevilson’s activities on the
second floor inside his home. Nevilson will argue that the fact that he is
inside his home alone suggests that the photo captures private facts, be67. Id.
68. Schiller, 828 N.E.2d 323, 329.
69. Mark, 618 P.2d at 512.
70. Swerdlick v. Koch, 721 A.2d 849, 857 (R.I. 1998).
71. Id.
72. Id. at 858.
73. (R. at 6-10).
74. Wehling, 721 F.2d at 509; Schiller, 828 N.E.2d at 329; Swerdlick, 721 A.2d at 857;
Mark, 618 P.2d at 519-20.
75. Id.
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cause most details of life in the home are considered private.76 Nevilson
will again find support for this argument in Webb v. CBS Broadcasting
Inc., to demonstrate his conviction that he was engaged in a private act
while smoking.77 Here, Nevilson can analogize Webb on the facts, because, unlike plaintiffs in Webb, he was inside his home.
Further, Nevilson will likely argue that he indeed took affirmative
steps to ensure his privacy such as raising a six-foot fence and posting
the “Private Property” sign, showing that he expects to be in a private
place at his home, particularly inside his home. Nevilson will argue that
like the plaintiff in Digirolamo v. D.P. Anderson & Ass’n Inc., a case in
which the plaintiff alleged an invasion of privacy because she was videotaped and photographed with a telescopic lens from a public street, “[t]he
mere fact that [these devices] are powerful and becoming increasingly
common does not mean that, as a society, we must reasonably expect to
be watched through them when we are inside our homes unless we pull
our drapes or close our shutters.”78 Nevilson could also point out that in
Kyllo, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized that “in the home, . . . all details are intimate details, because the entire area is held safe from prying government eyes.”79 Additionally, even if Nevilson were visible to
some passers-by, such as tourists on the double-decker bus, this does not
signify that he waived his privacy toward the public at large. To this
effect, Nevilson might point to Huskey v. National Broadcasting Company, Inc., where the court found that even prison inmates had some
reasonable expectation of privacy, noting, that:
[the plaintiff’s] visibility to some people does not strip him of the right
to remain secluded from others. Persons are exposed to [some people],
but that does not mean they have opened the door to . . . cameras” and
“the mere fact a person can be seen by others does not mean that person
cannot legally be secluded.80

Nevilson will argue that if an inmate has an expectation of privacy
in prison, certainly he has an expectation of privacy in his own home,
whether or not he may be seen by some.
Nevilson should again point to Benitez81 and Lovgren,82 where both
courts noted that peering into the home of another person was an example of intrusion and this is exactly what the M.A.P. mobile did to Nevilson. Therefore, Nevilson should argue that what happens inside of the
76.
77.
78.
(Mass.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D cmt. b (1977).
Webb, 2009 WL 1285836 at *3.
Digirolamo v. D.P. Anderson & Assoc., No. Civ.A. 97-3623, 1999 WL 345592, at *1
Super. Ct. May 26, 1999).
Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 373.
Huskey v. NBC, 632 F. Supp. 2d 1282, 1287-88 (N.D. Ill. 1986).
Supra, note 25.
Supra, note 26.
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home is inherently private and the M.A.P. mobile’s photos of the actions
inside his home were private matters. Thus, Nevilson should argue that
the matter here was private, and at a minimum the issue of its privacy is
a material issue of fact that should defeat summary judgment.
5. Anguish or Suffering
The element requiring a plaintiff to demonstrate that the intrusion
caused anguish and suffering is not required by the Restatement (Second) of Torts. In fact, the Restatement requires only the above four elements to hold a defendant liable for intrusion upon seclusion. Some
states however, do include this additional requirement, i.e. that the intrusion must cause anguish and suffering.83 Thus, the parties may discuss this element as an additional but not necessary element because the
State of Marshall follows the Restatement (Second) of Torts.
The anguish and suffering of the alleged victim must be a result of
the intrusion itself and it is not presumed.84 For example, this element
looks to the discomfort caused when someone enters a person’s bedroom,
opens his or her mail, or makes repeated and unwanted telephone
calls.85 A plaintiff can establish anguish or suffering by establishing actual injury such as “a loss of reputation and integrity in the community.”86 For example, in Schmidt, evidence that the plaintiff was
infuriated and emotionally upset because her former employer had broken the trust she placed with the company was sufficient to support a
finding of anguish and suffering even though the plaintiff never sought
medical or psychological assistance.87
Nevilson will likely argue that the intrusion by the M.A.P. mobile
caused damage to his reputation in the community. He should highlight
the fact that prior to the intrusion he was highly respected in the community and expected to receive a high value endorsement deal upon
qualifying for the 2010 Olympics.88 As a result of the intrusion, however, Nevilson lost the endorsement deal. Further, Nevilson should
point to the mental anguish he suffered as a result of the intrusion which
affected his performance in the Olympic Trials. Rather than focusing on
training for the Olympic Trials, Nevilson spent his time handling all of
the media attention and trying to clear his name. As a result, he failed
to qualify for the 2010 Olympics.89
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Schmidt, 768 N.E.2d at 316.
Id.
Thomas v. Pearl, 998 F.2d 447, 452 (7th Cir. 1993).
Schmidt, 768 N.E.2d at 316.
Id.
(R. at 5).
(R. at 7).
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Marshoogle will likely argue that the intrusion did not cause Nevilson anguish or suffering. Rather, Marshoogle will point to the fact that
any injury Nevilson suffered was a result of the link on SportsBlog and
the subsequent negative media attention Nevilson received. Marshoogle
should argue that this type of injury cannot be the basis of an intrusion
claim because there can be no liability for intrusion upon seclusion
where the harm comes from the publication, rather than the actual intrusion.90 Thus, Marshoogle cannot be liable because the alleged damage to Nevilson’s reputation came not from the M.A.P. mobile’s alleged
intrusion, rather it came from the posting on SportsBlog and subsequent
publication of the photo by various media outlets.91
C. PUBLICATION OF PRIVATE FACTS
i.

General

An invasion of privacy may also be committed when “unreasonable
publicity [is] given to another’s private life.”92 This kind of invasion of
privacy is committed by publishing private and otherwise not widely
known facts about an individual, the publication of which would be offensive to a reasonable person. Liability attaches even if the information
publicized is true. Such a claim can only be successful, however, if the
facts in question are not legitimately newsworthy.
ii. Elements
Marshall law requires that a plaintiff claiming publication of private
facts prove: (1) publication of a matter; (2) publication of a matter concerning the private life of another; (3) that the matter publicized would
be highly offensive to a reasonable person; and (4) that the matter is not
of legitimate concern to the public.93
1. Publicity Given to the Disclosure of Nevilson’s Private Facts
Marshoogle has conceded that the posting of Nevilson’s photograph
on its websites constituted publication.94 Therefore, no analysis of this
90. See Webb, 2009 WL 1285836, at *4 (stating that plaintiffs’ claim for intrusion upon
seclusion would have failed if they had only alleged harm from the publication rather than
the videotaping as well); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B cmt. b (1977); Barker v.
Manti Telephone Co., 2009 WL 47110, at *4 (D. Utah Jan. 6, 2009) (stating “it is that affirmative physical intrusion, eavesdropping, investigation, examination or prying that constitutes the tort, not any subsequent sharing of the information learned in an intrusion. . .
the dissemination of what is learned in an intrusion by a passive recipient of the information is not itself an intrusion upon seclusion”).
91. (R. at 6).
92. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D cmt B (1977).
93. (R. at 10); Marshall Rev. Code § 762(b).
94. (R. at 11).
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element is necessary.
2. Private Facts of Nevilson’s life
The second element of publication of private facts requires that the
facts made public were private, not public. As mentioned above under
the intrusion section, matters that are already public or open to the public eye will not subject a defendant to liability for further publicizing
them.95 While a plaintiff cannot claim his privacy is invaded when his
picture is taken on the street, he can complain when a photo is taken
without his consent in a private place and later published.96 Not every
action a person takes is private, but most details of life in the home are
considered private.97 When these kinds of details are publicized in a
manner that is highly offensive to a reasonable person without a legitimate public interest, there has been an invasion of privacy.98
Marshoogle will make the same arguments under the intrusion
claim, that the publication did not involve any private facts about Nevilson’s life because his activities were open to any passersby on the street.
In addition it could also point to Showler v. Harper’s Magazine Foundation,99 in which the court held that because the family disclosed the funeral scene to the public eye, the open casket did not constitute a private
fact whose disclosure could create liability.100 Marshoogle will argue
that Nevilson opened his habits to the public by smoking his hookah in
front of a second-story window of his home.101 In addition, Nevilson accepted his celebrity and attracted additional public interest by purchasing a home located in a celebrity “studded” neighborhood known to
attract curious tourists aboard double-decker buses.102
Nevilson will also reiterate his arguments under the intrusion claim
stating that the facts publicized by Marshoogle were in fact private. He
will emphasize that even if he were visible to some it does not equate to a
waiver of privacy to all. Nevilson will likely point again to Sanders103
and Huskey,104 claiming that if “a reasonable expectation of privacy has
95. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D cmt. B (1977).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Showler v. Harper’s Magazine Found., 222 F. App’x 755, 764 (10th Cir. 2007). In
this case the plaintiffs were family members of a fallen National Guardsman. Id. at 759.
They sued a magazine publisher for printing photographs of the deceased during his opencasket funeral after they had specifically requested no photography of the dead body. Id.
See also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D cmt. b (1977).
100. Showler, 222 F. App’x at 764.
101. (R. at 6).
102. (R. at 6).
103. Sanders, 978 P.2d at 67.
104. Huskey, 632 F. Supp. at 1288.
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been found in semi-public places, such as hospital rooms, private parties
and the like,”105 individuals must be afforded privacy in their residence
even if they declined or forgot to draw the blinds. Nevilson will also argue that like in Huskey, just because some passers-by may have been
capable of viewing him, this does not automatically deprive him of the
right to remain secluded from others, especially technologically advanced
cameras.106 At a minimum this constitutes an issue of fact better left for
a jury to decide.
3. Offensive Nature of Marshoogle’s Publication
The third element of publication of private facts requires that the
private facts publicized be highly offensive to a reasonable person. Privacy is viewed relative to customs of time, place, and community.107
Marshoogle will argue that the publication of ordinary activities is
not any more offensive to a reasonable person than the mere observation
is an intrusion upon seclusion. As noted in the Restatement (Second) of
Torts, “[c]omplete privacy does not exist in this world except in a desert,”
and anyone not living in a desert is subject to ordinary disclosures of
everyday life.108 A person “must expect the more or less casual observation of his neighbors as to what he does, and that his comings and goings
and his ordinary daily activities, will be described in the press as a matter of casual interest to others.”109 A publication is highly offensive only
when a reasonable person would be “seriously aggrieved” by it.110 Marshoogle will claim that Nevilson failed to establish the offensiveness
prong since he cannot demonstrate that the defendant should have realized its conduct would offend persons of ordinary sensibilities, and not
merely the supersensitive.111 Marshoogle will argue that it is highly unlikely that a reasonable person in the state of Marshall would be offended or aggrieved by Marshoogle’s lawful activity of mapping and
cataloguing public streets,112 a fact that is further evidenced by the immense popularity of this online feature.113
105. Sanders, 978 P.2d at 67.
106. Huskey, 632 F.Supp. at 1288 (stating “[the plaintiff’s] visibility to some people does
not strip him of the right to remain secluded from others. Persons are exposed to [some]. . .
but that does not mean they have opened the door to . . . cameras”).
107. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D cmt. c (1977).
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Bitsie v. Walston, 515 P.2d 659, 661 (N.M. Ct. App. 1973). Essentially, the disclosure must be of a variety where it would objectively cause shame or humiliation to a reasonable person. See also Claspill v. Craig, 586 S.W.2d 458, 461 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979).
112. Boring, 598 F. Supp. 2d at 700.
113. (R. at 4).
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Nevilson will once again reiterate his arguments under the intrusion
claim stressing that one of the most fundamental aspects of privacy is
that “the heart of our liberty is choosing which parts of our lives will
become public and which parts we hold close.”114 Nevilson should also
point to the Restatement to argue that “[e]very individual
has. . .activities and some facts about himself that he does not expose to
the public eye, but keeps entirely to himself. . .[including] most details of
a man’s life in his home.”115 In addition, this method of publication is
further offensive because the technology involved allows for enhancement, reproduction and manipulation, as evidenced by the posting of
Nevilson’s photograph on Marshoogle’s SportsBlog captioned with implications of illegal drug use. Therefore, Nevilson will argue that capturing
and publishing images of him engaging in a private activity within the
walls of his home would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.116 At
least, especially considering the novel questions posed by the technology
involved and the nature of the world-wide and instantaneous publication
over the Internet, the determination of offensiveness to a reasonable person should be resolved by a jury and not through a motion for summary
judgment.117
4. Newsworthiness
The fourth element of the tort of publication of private facts requires
that the matter not be of legitimate public concern.118
Marshoogle will likely argue that even if the facts published are
found to be private, it is still not liable because publication of private
facts is permissible when those facts pertain to matters of legitimate
public concern.119 Matters of legitimate public concern involve societal
114. 62A Am. Jur. 2d Privacy §1 (2009); see also Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1890) (commenting that “the individual is
entitled to decide whether that which is his shall be given to the public.”).
115. Restatement (Second) of Torts §652D cmt. b (1977).
116. Restatement (Second) of Torts §652D cmt. c (1977). “It is only when the publicity
given to him is such that a reasonable person would feel justified in feeling seriously aggrieved by it that the cause of action arises.” Id.
117. See Miller v. Motorola, Inc., 560 N.E.2d 900, 903 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (holding that
the court “cannot say as a matter of law that the disclosure of [a mastectomy to co-workers]
. . . would not be highly offensive to the reasonable person.”); See Vassiliades v. Garfinckel’s
et al, 492 A.2d 580, 588 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (finding that the question of whether a publication
was highly offensive to a reasonable person is a determination of fact for the jury); see also
Gill v. Hearst Pub. Co., 253 P.2d 441, 446 (Cal. 1953) (Carter, J., dissenting) (stating that
the question of whether the depiction would seriously offend a person of ordinary sensibilities is a question for the trier of fact).
118. Marshall Revised Code 762(b); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D, cmt. d
(1977); See Cox Broad. Co v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
119. Cox, 420 U.S. at 469; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D cmt. d (1977).
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safety, health, morals, and welfare.120 In Cox Broad. Co. v. Cohn, the
U.S. Supreme Court held that “[t]he commission of a crime . . . [is] without question [an] event[ ] of legitimate concern to the public.”121 Courts
consider several factors in determining whether or not a matter is considered newsworthy including: (1) the social value of the facts published;
(2) the depth of the . . . intrusion into ostensibly private affairs; and (3)
the extent to which the party voluntarily acceded to a position of public
notoriety.122 Only when (1) disclosure does not provide the public with
information to which it is entitled, or (2) when disclosure becomes “a
morbid and sensational prying into private lives for its own sake,”123
does the privacy interest outweigh the public interest in information.
Marshoogle will also argue that those who voluntarily place themselves
in the public eye, such as celebrities or, in this present case, pro athletes,
have a diminished expectation of privacy.124 Neither condition applies
to this case.
Marshoogle will likely argue the publication of images of Nevilson
smoking from a hookah was not “a morbid and sensational prying into
private lives for its own sake.” Unlike the defendants in Green v. Chicago Tribune Co.,125 Marshoogle obtained the photograph of Nevilson
from a public road; the M.A.P. mobile did not intentionally and purposefully set out to spy on Nevilson but captured the infamous photographs
“by happenstance,” incidentally to its mission of mapping the neighborhood of the Emerald Pools.126 Marshhogle will also argue that the re120. Green v. Chi. Tribune Co., 675 N.E.2d 249 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996).
121. Cox, 420 U.S. 469.
122. Id.; see also Kapellas v. Kofman, 459 P.2d 912, 922 (Cal. 1969). “[W]hen the legitimate public interest in the published information is substantial, a much greater intrusion
into an individual’s private life will be sanctioned.” Id.; see also Downing v. Abercrombie &
Fitch, 265 F.3d 994, 1001 (9th Cir. 2001) (stating “no cause of action will lie for the publication of matters in the public interest, which rests on the right of the public to know”).
123. Restatement (second) of Torts § 652D cmt. h (1977); see also Boston Herald, Inc. v.
Sharpe, 737 N.E.2d 859, 872-73 (Mass. 2000) (stating “[w]hen the subject matter of publicity is of legitimate public concern . . . there is no invasion of privacy”).
124. 1 J. Thomas McCarthy, The Rights of Publicity and Privacy § 5:77 (2d ed. 2005).
The Restatement distinguishes between the “Voluntary Public Figure” that chooses to attract public attention, and the “Involuntary Public Figure,” who does not seek attention,
but nonetheless become a “legitimate subject of public interest.” Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 652D, cmt. e-f (1977). The former group is characterized by actors, prize fighters,
and public officers, while the latter is comprised of victims and perpetrators of catastrophes
and crimes. Id.
125. Green, 675 N.E.2d at 256. In Green, newspaper reporters photographed a minor
undergoing critical heart massage to resuscitate him following an ultimately fatal gunshot
wound. Id. at 251. The reporters prevented the boy’s mother from entering his hospital
room, and after she refused to give a statement, they listened to what she first said to her
son upon seeing his body. Id. The newspaper published the unauthorized photo and statement in a front-page article. Id.
126. (R. at 7).
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cord establishes, as a matter of law, that the photographs published of
Nevilson were of a legitimate public concern. Nevilson enjoyed a “growing reputation” and he had willingly assumed the status of a role-model,
and anti-drug spokesperson “featured in several promotional publications of Marshall City Against Drugs campaign.”127 Further, the fact
that Nevilson was likely to represent the State of Marshall and the U.S.
in the Olympics weighs heavily in favor of a finding that these images
were of legitimate public concern. Marshoogle will argue that the public
has a legitimate interest in drug and other criminal activities rendering
the reasonable speculation that Nevilson used illegal drugs a matter for
public disclosure. In the case of a successful athlete and role model for
the Marshall youth, even legal activity such as smoking tobacco is of
public interest since it is rather inappropriate considering Nevilson’s status. Thus, it cannot be disputed that Nevilson was a public figure and as
such, Nevilson inherently had a reduced expectation of privacy.128 In
addition, his expectation of privacy was even further reduced because he
voluntarily moved to a neighborhood that was a “popular tourist attraction,” frequented by “double-decker celebrity bus tours.”129 Consequently, because Nevilson had willingly assumed the role of an anti-drug
spokesperson and role-model and had received national media attention,
the publicized matters were in fact newsworthy130 and summary judgment in favor of Marshoogle was proper.
Nevilson will likely counter-argue that unlike the defendant in Cox,
who publicized information obtained from publicly available sources,131
Marshoogle obtained the photographs by invading Nevilson’s privacy.
Furthermore, Nevilson will argue that the activity captured by the lens
of the M.A.P. mobile does not qualify as newsworthy. The court, in Shulman, held that “[n]ewsworthiness depends upon the logical relationship
or nexus between the event that brought the plaintiff into the public eye
and the particular facts disclosed, so long as the facts are not intrusive in
great disproportion to their relevance.”132 Here, the photographs portrayed Nevilson within his home engaging in private and lawful acts,
thus, they cannot constitute newsworthy information. Courts have imposed limitations as to the nature of the public’s interest in certain af127. (R. at 5-6).
128. See James v. Gannett Co., 353 N.E.2d 834, 876 (N.Y. 1976). “The category of public
figures . . . include[s], without doubt . . . performers such as professional athletes.” Id.
129. (R. at 6).
130. Michaels v. Internet Entm’t Group, Inc., No. CV-98-0583, 1998 WL 882848, at *7
(C.D. Cal. Sept. 11, 1998); Shulman v. Group W. Prods. Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 479 (Cal. 1998)
(holding that “the lack of newsworthiness is an element of the private facts tort,” making
newsworthiness a complete bar to common law liability).
131. Cox, 420 U.S. 469.
132. Shulman, 955 P.2d at 478-79.
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fairs, finding that even if there is a legitimate public interest, some
matters should simply be outside the scope of the public realm.133 In
addition, even if “the dissemination of truthful, newsworthy material is
not actionable as a publication of private facts,”134 Marshoogle’s publication on SportsBlog implied that Nevilson used illegal drugs. These statements were untrue as evidenced by the record.135 Therefore, because
this publication was false, Marshoogle cannot claim that Nevilson’s private facts were newsworthy. Moreover, Nevilson will argue that weblogs
such as SportsBlog, “are not held to the same journalistic standards that
regulate the mainstream media.”136 Therefore, because Marshoogle is
not considered a member of the press, the images cannot be of a legitimate concern to the public.
Additionally, Nevilson will argue that, even if as a public figure, he
“cannot complain when he is given publicity that he sought, even though
it may be unfavorable to him” the publication in SportsBlog had absolutely nothing to do with his public persona. Unlike in O’Brien v. Pabst
Sales Co.,137 in which the court held that a public figure has no right of
privacy as to public activities, Nevilson’s published photograph is a public disclosure of the private life of a person, a photograph obtained unlawfully, without his consent or knowledge, while he sat in the privacy of
his living room. Moreover, Nevilson will point to Gallela v. Onassis, in
which the court held that even a highly popular former first lady of the
U.S. maintains privacy rights despite her fame.138 Also, the court in
Virgil v. Time, Inc., pointed out that, although one, through “some activity, vocational or avocational,” can as a matter of law be said to attract
legitimate public interest” limitations must be imposed to prevent “expos[ing] everyone’s private life to public view.”139 Therefore, Nevislon
will argue that because smoking in his living room does not pertain to
Nevilson’s status as a public figure, the Court of Appeals erred in finding
133. See Vassiliades, 192 A.2d at 589 (stating that ‘[c]ertain private facts about a person
should never be publicized, even if the facts concern matters which are, or relate to persons
who are, of legitimate public interest.”); see also Gilbert v. Med. Econs. Co., 665 F.2d 305,
308 (10th Cir. 1981) (finding that “[b]ecause each member of our society at some time engages in an activity that fairly could be characterized as a matter of legitimate public concern, to permit that activity to open the door to the exposure of any truthful secret about
that person would render meaningless the tort of public disclosure of private facts”).
134. Shulman, 955 P.2d at 478-81.
135. (R. at 7-8).
136. Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 467 (Del. 2005) (referencing “the normally (and inherently) unreliable nature of assertions posted in chat rooms and on blogs.”).
137. O’Brien v. Pabst Sales Co., 124 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 823
(1942).
138. Gallela v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986 (2d Cir. 1973).
139. Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122, 1131 (9th Cir. 1975). See also Garner v. Triangle Publ’n, Inc., 97 F. Supp. 546, 549 (D.C.N.Y. 1951) (determining that “being a public
figure ipso facto does not automatically destroy in total a person’s right of privacy”).
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that Nevilson’s expectation of privacy regarding that activity was diminished as a result of his celebrity. At least, Nevilson has raised genuine
issues of material fact with respect to each element of his public disclosure of private facts claim.
D. TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH BUSINESS EXPECTANCY
i.

General

Tortious interference with business expectancy occurs when a person intentionally damages the plaintiff’s contractual or other business
relationships. Tortious interference with business expectancy takes
place when the defendant acts to prevent the plaintiff from successfully
establishing business relationships. The relations protected against by
this form of intentional interference include any prospective contractual,
or other, relations if the potential contract would be of pecuniary value to
the plaintiff. 140 In brief, this tort occurs when the defendant’s conduct
intentionally causes the plaintiff not to enter into a business relationship
with a third party that otherwise would probably have occurred.
ii. Elements
Nevilson’s final claim alleges that Marshoogle is liable for tortious
interference with business expectancy. Under the applicable Marshall
Code, a plaintiff must establish: “(1) a reasonable expectancy of entering
into a valid business relationship; (2) the defendant’s knowledge of the
expectancy; (3) the defendant’s purposeful interference that prevents the
realization of the business expectancy; and (4) damages resulting from
the interference.”141
140. See also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766B.
141. Marshall Rev. Code § 762(b); See also (R. at 12). This Code adopts the rule applied
in a number of cases. See e.g. Lusher v. Becker Bros, Inc., 509 N.E.2d 444 (Ill. App. Ct.
1987); Downers Grove Volkswagen, Inc. v. Wigglesworth Imports, Inc., 546 N.E.2d 33 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1989). This tort is virtually identical to the tort of intentional interference with
prospective economic advantage. In Anderson v. Vanden Dorpel, the Illinois Supreme
Court determined that for a plaintiff to state a cause of action for intentional interference
with prospective economic advantage, such “plaintiff must allege (1) a reasonable expectancy of entering into a valid business relationship, (2) the defendant’s knowledge of the
expectancy, (3) an intentional and unjustified interference by the defendant that induced or
caused a breach or termination of the expectancy, and (4) damage to the plaintiff resulting
from the defendant’s interference.” Anderson v. Vanded Dorpel, 667 N.E.2d 1296, 1299 (Ill.
1996). By analogy, cases presenting the tort of intentional interference with prospective
economic advantage may be used in the Court’s consideration of the current issue before
the Court, namely tortious interference with business expectancy.
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1. Reasonable Expectancy of Relationship
The first element of the tort is a reasonable expectancy of a valid
business relationship. There need not be an enforceable contract between two parties; rather, the tort is actionable if there is an interference
with a reasonable expectation of a business relationship.142 Thus, prospective employment may be protected if a sufficient factual basis is established.143 However, the mere hope of receiving a job offer is not
sufficient to constitute a reasonable business expectancy.144 Furthermore, the facts must show that the interference caused by the defendant
must be towards some third party and not the plaintiff.145 The plaintiff
must show he had a reasonable business expectancy with a specific third
party “or an identifiable prospective class of third persons.”146 However,
there need not be contact between the defendant and the third party.147
Nevilson had several prospective endorsement deals, including a potential three million dollar contract from Sunshine AthleticWear.148 Additionally, several other corporations expressed interest in Nevilson
representing their products.149 In American Broadcasting Co. v.
Maljack Productions, Inc., American Broadcasting received footage from
the BBC believing it could grant a license to the defendant Maljack Productions.150 The BBC obtained an injunction preventing the defendant
from distributing the film.151 The defendant claimed that by the BBC
sending cease and desist letters to various broadcasting agencies, including Reader’s Digest, it tortiously interfered with its prospective economic
advantage.152 The court held that a reasonable juror could find that a
single phone call with Reader’s Digest was “sufficient to create a reasonable business expectancy and that the BBC was aware of that
expectancy.”153
The Sunshine AthleticWear contract was contingent on Nevilson becoming a member of the U.S. Olympic Diving Team. Nevilson will argue
that he would have made the U.S. Olympic Diving Team. He had previously won three gold medals in the 2007 Junior World Diving Championships and it was predicted “he would trounce the competition” at the
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

Lusher, 509 N.E.2d at 446.
Anderson, 667 N.E.2d at1299-00.
Id. at 1299.
Hoopla Sports and Entm’t, Inc. v. Nike, Inc., 947 F.Supp. 347, 357 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
Downers Grove Volkswagen, Inc., 546 N.E.2d at 37.
Schuler v. Abbott Lab., 639 N.E.2d 144, 147 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993).
(R. at 6).
(R. at 6).
Am. Broad. Co. v. Maljack Productions, Inc., 34 F.Supp.2d 665, 670 (N.D. Ill. 1998).
Id. at 670.
Id.
Id. at 674.
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Olympic Trials.154 Nevilson was also considered the favorite to place in
the top spot by mainstream media and sports new outlets.155 Furthermore, the president of Sunshine AthleticWear admitted an endorsement
deal was already negotiated and would be signed if Nevilson made the
U.S. Olympic Team.156 Like in American Broadcasting Co., one prospective deal, the Sunshine AthleticWear contract, is enough to create a reasonable business expectancy.
Marshoogle will likely argue that Nevilson’s chance of becoming a
member of the U.S. Olympic Diving Team was speculative because he
was just one of several athletic competitors vying for a spot on the
Olympic team. In Hoopla Sports and Entertainment, Inc. v. Nike, the
plaintiff’s president conceived of a basketball game involving high school
age boys, the theme of which was international peace and freedom.157
The president sent a letter to the Sports Marketing Director at Nike
soliciting Nike’s sponsorship.158 A year later Nike planned a nearly exact replica game, soliciting the same sponsors the plaintiff did.159 The
plaintiff alleged that Nike’s actions interfered with the plaintiff’s expectation with several sponsors.160 The court held that Nike did not interfere with any expectancy because the plaintiff only wrote letters and
hoping to receive an offer is not a sufficient expectancy.161
As in Hoopla Sports and Entertainment, Nevilson was only hoping to
receive an offer once he was placed on the U.S. Olympic Diving Team.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court of Illinois held that a leading candidate
for a job was not a sufficient expectancy even if her interviewers recommended her for the job.162 Likewise, Nevilson’s hope of receiving an offer
is not a sufficient expectancy. Marshoogle will also argue that “several
other major corporations” informally expressing interest in Nevilson’s
representation163 is too vague to identify a party with whom a potential
business relationship could be formed.
Nevilson will argue that there is a specific third party, as well as a
prospective class.164 In Downers Grove Volkswagen, the plaintiff identi154. (R. at 5).
155. Id.
156. (R. at 6).
157. Hoopla Sports and Entm’t, Inc., 947 F.Supp. at 350.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 350-51.
160. Id at 357.
161. Id. at 358.
162. Anderson, 667 N.E.2d at1299-00.
163. (R. at 6).
164. See Parkway Bank & Trust Co. v. City of Darien, 357 N.E.2d 211, 215 (Ill. App. Ct.
1976) (stating that the third party can be a specific third party “or any clearly identifiable
group of third parties contemplating prospective contractual arrangements with the
plaintiff”).
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fied a class of people as those who had previously bought cars from the
plaintiff in the past.165 In Crinkley v. Dow Jones and Co., third party
descriptions of manufacturers of medical instruments or healthcare
products were deemed identifiable.166 In this case there is a specific
third party, Sunshine AthleticWear, but there is also a class of corporations who were rumored to have extended endorsement deals to Nevilson.167 Those various corporations can be considered a prospective class.
2. Knowledge of the Expectancy
The second element of the tort requires that the defendant had
knowledge of the expectancy of the business relationship between the
plaintiff and a third party. However, the defendant does not have to
have knowledge of the specific details of a plaintiff’s prospective business
relationships.168 Likewise, knowledge of the specific customers or the
specific nature of the relationship between the plaintiff and a third party
is not required either.169 Therefore, it is sufficient for the plaintiff to
merely allege knowledge of business relationships.170
Nevilson will argue that Marshoogle knew of his relationship with
Sunshine AthleticWear. Marshoogle had a popular SportsBlog that included posts from Marshoogle News’ own staff who posted predictions
that Nevilson “would trounce the competition at the trials.”171 The national media and local news outlets throughout Marshall picked up the
statements from the president of Sunshine AthleticWear.172 Furthermore, the SportsBlog referred to Nevilson as the “three million dollar
man,” referring to Sunshine Athletic-Wear’s offer.173
Marshoogle is unlikely to be successful in arguing that it had no
knowledge of Nevilson’s expectancy of any business relationships. Marshoogle could possibly attempt to claim that it had openly questioned
Nevilson’s status on SportsBlog where it was stated that “his role model
status was exaggerated.”174 Thus, Marshoogle had no actual knowledge
of any expectancy because his popularity was greatly overstated. Additionally, the rumors of deals with various unidentified corporations were
just that, unsubstantiated rumors that may prove to be false.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

Downers Grove Volkswagen, 546 N.E.2d at 37.
Crinkley v. Dow Jones & Co., 385 N.E.2d 714, 721-22 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978).
(R. at 6, 12).
Malatesta v. Leichter, 542 N.E.2d 768, 780 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989).
Id. at 780.
Id.
(R. at 4-5).
(R. at 6).
(R. at 7).
(R. at 6).
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3. Purposeful Interference of Expectancy
The third element of the tort requires the plaintiff to show that the
defendant purposefully interfered with the business expectancy. The defendant’s intentional interference must prevent the plaintiff’s “expectancy from ripening into a valid business relationship.”175 The
defendant must have intent to interfere with the relationship and that
intent must actually cause the interference. This element encompasses
two components, intention and causation. However, even if the defendant intentionally interferes with the plaintiff’s business expectancy, he
may be able to raise the affirmative defense of privilege.
a.

Intention

The first component of the purposeful interference element is intention. The plaintiff must allege facts that show the defendant acted with
the purpose of injuring plaintiff’s expectancies.176 The defendant must
have purposely caused a third party not to enter into a contractual relationship with the plaintiff.177 Therefore, the plaintiff must allege facts
that indicate that the defendant “acted with the purpose of injuring
plaintiff’s expectancies.”178
Nevilson will argue that interference with a prospective economic
advantage is deemed purposeful or intentional when the actor desires to
bring about such interference or knows that his or her actions are at
least “substantially certain” to result in such interference.179 Thus, it is
sufficient to allege “some impropriety committed by the defendant in interfering with the plaintiff’s expectancy of entering into a valid business
relationship with an identifiable third party.”180 Nevilson will analogize
to the facts in Downers Grove Volkswagen, Inc. v. Wigglesworth Imports,
Inc., where the defendant published a brochure with false information
about the plaintiff’s services.181 In Downers Grove the court stated, “an
allegation that a party essentially printed information with a reckless
disregard for the truth is sufficient to allege improper conduct.”182
Consequently, Nevilson will claim that although the mere publication of the infamous photograph on M.A.P. might have not been deemed
175. J. Eck & Sons, Inc. v. Reuben H. Donnelley Corp., 572 N.E.2d 1090, 1093 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1991).
176. Hoopla Sports & Entm’t, Inc., 947 F.Supp. at 357.
177. Parkway Bank & Trust Co., 357 N.E.2d at 215.
178. Hoopla Sports & Entm’t, Inc., 947 F.Supp. at 357.
179. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766B cmt. b (1979).
180. Romanek v. Connelly, 753 N.E.2d 1062, 1073 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001) citing Dowd &
Dowd, Ltd. v. Gleason, 693 N.E.2d 358, 371 (Ill. 1998).
181. Downer Grove Volkswagen v. Wigglesworth Imports Inc., 546 N.E.2d 33, 35 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1989).
182. Id. at 37.
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sufficient to satisfy this element, the subsequent publication on
SportsBlog with the suggestive comments, clearly insinuating that
Nevilson smoked marijuana and directing Internet users to visit the photograph on M.A.P. constitutes sufficient evidence that Marshoogle acted
with impropriety and reckless disregard for the truth in this instance.
Marshoogle had knowledge of Nevilson’s status as a spokesperson of
Marshall City Against Drugs and his impending deals.183 Marshoogle
knew or should have been at least “substantially certain” that its actions
would result in such interference. Indeed, because of these false allegations and the resulting negative media attention, Nevilson focused on
clearing his name and lost focus in his preparation Olympic Trials ultimately costing him the qualification to the 2010 Olympics. In additional
support of his argument Nevilson will point to Marshoogle’s failure to
blur his picture on the website and its subsequent delay in removing the
photographs, arguably in order to benefit from the increased traffic to its
website.184 Based on the above, Nevilson will claim that he has sufficiently alleged that Marshoogle acted with “some impropriety” interfering with his business expectancy.
Marshoogle will likely claim that Nevilson failed to establish that
Marshoogle “acted with the purpose of interfering with appellant’s prospective economic advantage”185 In support of his argument Marshoogle
could point to Crinkley v. Dow Jones & Co., where the court considered
an alleged interference with prospective business relationships when the
defendant published a defaming article about the plaintiff. The court
dismissed this claim because, although defendant intended to make the
statements, the plaintiff could not show that the defendant acted with
the purpose to interfere with business relationships.186 Marshoogle
could also point to the Restatement for a list of factors to be considered in
similar cases, including, among others; the nature of the actor’s conduct,
the actor’s motive, and the interests sought to be advanced by the actor.187 In addition, even though an actor may know that interference
will result, if the primary purpose of the conduct is legitimate, then the
conduct may not be actionable.188
183. (R. at 6).
184. (R. at 7).
185. Crinkley, 385 N.E.2d at 722 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978).
186. Id. at 880.
187. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766B cmt. d (1979). “Together these factors mean
that the actor’s purpose is of substantial significance. If he had no desire to effectuate the
interference by his action but knew that it would be a mere incidental result of conduct he
was engaging in for another purpose, the interference may be found to be not improper.”
Id.
188. Id.
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Based on the above, Marshoogle will claim that it did not publish the
picture in question with the purpose of harming Nevilson, but rather to
update and enhance the M.A.P. feature, which constitutes a legitimate
purpose. Furthermore, the comments in question on SportsBlog were
made to discuss and report news and events regarding sports and athletes. SportsBlog acted as any other news outlet or discussion forum. In
addition, comments critical of Nevilson’s activities had been published
before on SportsBlog, but Nevilson did not complain and the comment
did not affect his popularity or business relationships.189 Any harm resulting from the posting on SportsBlog was merely incidental, and did
not occur due to improper action by Marshoogle. As to the removal of the
photograph in question, Marshoogle will argue that it promptly removed
the picture upon Nevilson’s request.190 In addition, Marshoogle could
prove there was an electronic malfunction and not intentional human
intervention that left Nevilson’s face visible in the picture. Therefore, no
impropriety may be established.
b.

Causation

The second component of the purposeful interference element is causation. The defendant’s actions must be the cause of the interference
with a plaintiff’s business expectancy. This purposeful interference must
prevent “the expectancy from ripening into a valid business
relationship.”191
Nevilson will likely argue that Marshoogle’s printing of the picture
and subsequent negative publicity surrounding him caused him to perform below average. Additionally, the appearance of impropriety on
Nevilson’s part caused him to lose his prospective endorsement deals. It
was revealed to Nevilson that it was not “in the company’s best interests
to have him represent them.”192 Marshoogle will likely counter argue
that it is not responsible for Nevilson’s performance in the Olympic Trials because any number of factors could have come into play. Nevilson’s
ability could have been overblown and the competitors, who beat Nevilson, beat him purely based on skill. However, Marshoogle will likely lose
on its claim that it’s posting of the pictures and subsequent criticisms of
Nevilson did not cause the chain reaction of other media outlets republishing and commenting on the pictures. Furthermore, Nevilson was
made aware that the sponsors did not want his representation because of
the surrounding controversy.193
189. (R. at 6).
190. (R. at 4).
191. J. Eck & Sons, Inc., 572 N.E.2d at 1092.
192. (R. at 8).
193. Id. The Marshall City Against Drugs campaign refused any further work with
Nevilson on the campaign. Id.
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Privilege Defense

A third component that may be raised by Marshoogle is the privilege
defense. The opportunity to obtain customers is a protected business expectancy.194 A party is privileged to interfere with a relationship between a plaintiff and a third party if the interference was without malice
or was not done with wrongful means.195 Wrongful means includes interference that is improper.196 Such improper conduct includes publishing information with a reckless disregard for its truth.197 To determine
if publishing information with a reckless disregard for its truth rises to
the level of improper conduct, there are several factors to consider:
(a) the nature of the actor’s conduct, (b) the actor’s motive, (c) the interests of the other with which the actor’s conduct interferes, (d) the interests sought to be advanced by the actor, (e) the social interests in
protecting the freedom of action of the actor and the contractual interests of the other, (f) the proximity or remoteness of the actor’s conduct
to the interference, and (g) the relations between the parties.198

Marshoogle will likely argue that it was privileged to post the picture in question on M.A.P. because it was trying to enhance its mapping
feature and draw visitors to its website, which is a legitimate business
purpose. The pictures taken were to create a 360 degree tour of the
whole town in an entirely automated process.199 Marshoogle did not intentionally take Nevilson’s picture but the instance was haphazardly
captured by the photographic lens. Additionally, Marshoogle could claim
that Nevilson’s representation as the face of Marshall’s anti-drug campaign was a social wrong and Nevilson should not be allowed to protest
the very thing he did himself.
Nevilson will likely argue that Marshoogle posted the picture and
SportsBlog directed users to it insinuating illegal drug use without verifying if Nevilson was actually doing drugs. Nevilson was using a hookah
pipe to smoke tobacco rather than illegal drugs.200 Furthermore, Nevilson will argue that Marshoogle acted purely in its own economic interests because it did not blur his face in the published picture, even though
it was Marshoogle’s policy to do so through a completely automated process.201 Furthermore, Marshoogle’s SportsBlog claimed Nevilson’s role
model status in Marshall’s anti-drug campaign was exaggerated. The
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

Downers Grove Volkswagen, 546 N.E.2d at 37.
Am. Broad. Co., 34 F.Supp.2d at 674.
Downers Grove Volkswagen, 546 N.E.2d at 36.
Id. at 37.
Id.
(R. at 4).
(R. at 6).
(R. at 4).
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relationship between Nevilson and Marshoogle could be considered
antagonistic.
4. Damages
The fourth element of the tort constitutes of damages resulting from
the interference.”202 The plaintiff must prove that actual damages occurred to fulfill the final element of the claim.203 General damages are
allowed because “the defendant should not be surprised by a proffer of
proof of the item of damage, since it is the natural and necessary consequence of the compensable injury alleged.”204 Because lost profits involve some uncertainty, the court is allowed to consider proof of
inferential character.205
Nevilson will likely argue that he suffered actual damages due to
Marshoogle’s interference. The court is allowed to make certain assumptions in calculating damages. In Maletesta, the court permitted certain
valuation assumptions and those assumptions “do not render the valuation faulty.”206 Before Marshoogle’s interference, Nevilson had the prospect of a three million dollar contract, as well as several other pending
endorsement deals. It may be difficult to quantify possible endorsement
deals that do not mention a dollar amount. However, the loss of the
three million dollar contract with Sunshine AthleticWear is easy to
calculate.
Marshoogle will likely argue that the damages are too speculative.
With Sunshine AthleticWear, the contract was contingent on Nevilson’s
placement on the Olympic Diving Team. Even with Nevilson’s favored
status as the frontrunner, there was nothing to guarantee he would become a member of the Olympic Diving Team. Furthermore, there were
only rumors of other endorsement contracts with other various
companies.
202.
N.E.2d
203.
204.
205.
206.

Marshall Rev. Code § 762(b); (R. at 12). See also Lusher v. Becker Bros, Inc., 509
444 (Ill.App. Ct. 1987); Downers Grove Volkswagen, 546 N.E.2d 33.
Hackman v. Dickerson Realtors, Inc., 557 F.Supp.2d 938, 953 (N.D. Ill. 2008).
Downers Grove Volkswagen, 546 N.E.2d at 38.
Maletesta, 542 N.E.2d at 784.
Id.
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